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FMD Vaccination:

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Introduction and General Information

Vaccination is of major importance in the protection of livestock in areas where FMD is endemic and continues to be used in conjunction with slaughter in the control of outbreaks in both FMD-free and FMD-endemic areas. Vaccination acts both to protect the individual animal and to provide herd immunity, by reducing the availability of susceptible animals.

  • "There is no doubt that modern FMD vaccines, in combination with other zoo-sanitary measures, can be used both to eradicate endemic FMD and to contain and eliminate FMD outbreaks that occur in normally FMD-free counties or zones. (J64.21.w25)

  • "Emergency vaccination should be seen as a major tool of first resort, along with culling of infected premises and known dangerous contacts, for controlling FMD outbreaks." (B495.8.w8 - full text provided)

Historically, the use of vaccination has been vitally important in the control of outbreaks, including large epizootics, within mainland Europe and has played an important part in the control and eventual eradication of foot-and-mouth from Europe and southern South America (J3.102.w10, J249.91.w2). The policy in Britain has previously been to employ slaughter and movement restrictions without any vaccination. However the effectiveness of, for example, ring vaccination around infected premises in mainland Europe led, following the 1967-68 outbreak, to the suggestion that "despite its disadvantages, vaccination could be a valuable, and highly cost-effective, adjunct to the slaughter policy for eradication of foot-and-mouth disease in Britain" (J3.102.w6). The Infectious Diseases in Livestock [Royal Society Inquiry Report], written following the 2001 epidemic in the UK (in which vaccination was not used) also stated "we recommend that emergency vaccination, together with other control measures, has an essential role in the control of future epidemics of FMD virus (FMDV)" and recommended that use of emergency vaccination should be considered "even for small outbreaks, to damp down local spread, and that its implementation in an outbreak should be immediate" (B495.8.w8) - full text included. Similarly, the Foot and Mouth Disease 2001- Lessons to Be Learned Inquiry Report recommended that the option for vaccination should form part "of any future strategy for the control of FMD" (B494.13.w13 - full text provided)

Vaccination is accepted as an adjunct to "stamping out" (J35.167.w2). Used in conjunction with slaughter of infected and in-contact animals, emergency vaccination provides an alternative to extended culling (B495.9.w9 - full text provided). The area in which vaccination should be carried out may vary depending on the circumstances of the outbreak, but for example it has been suggested that the vaccination of all susceptible domestic animals within a radius of approximately five miles of infected premises "may be expected to significantly reduce the number of farms on which the disease establishes itself, and thus remove much of the cost and distress of eradication, without reducing its effectiveness." (J3.102.w6).

  • Note:
    • Emergency vaccination preferably should be applied early in the outbreak. (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)
    • "Ideally, a situation in which the decision to vaccinate was delayed until the vaccination area encompassed most of the country would be avoided. Indeed there is an opinion that emergency vaccine should be employed as a first, rather than a last, resort." (J112.25.w3)
    • For emergency vaccination to be a realistic option [in the UK, or in other FMD-free countries], it must be planned in advance and included in contingency plans, with the necessary resources in place, agreement of major stakeholders, a planned exit strategy (e.g. use of appropriate serological tests), and acceptance that products from vaccinated livestock can enter the food chain normally. (B494.13.w13 - full text provided, B495.9.w9 - full text provided, J249.91.w2)

Following the decision to cease prophylactic vaccination in the EC, the option was retained to employ emergency vaccination if an outbreak of FMD was not immediately controlled by slaughter (J35.148.w1).

  • Prior to and following cessation of vaccination in the EU, several groups of individual countries have established "vaccine" banks. These include the UK based International Vaccine Bank (Britain, Eire, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand), the North American Bank (Mexico, USA and Canada), the very large EU Bank and also Switzerland, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, South Korea, Taiwan, with concentrated antigens held over liquid nitrogen. In the cased of the EU bank, the antigens are stored at Pirbright, Lyons and Brescia. Depending on the organisation formulating vaccine from these antigens, provision of emergency vaccines takes somewhere between 3 and 7 days.
  • Following the widespread FMD outbreak in the UK in 2001, with large number of animals culled for disease control, and the "vaccinate and slaughter" policy used to control FMD in the Netherlands, and taking into account changes in the OIE's Terrestrial Animal Health Code, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease (European Union) stated (Article 50, that emergency vaccination could be used in some circumstances:
    • "It may be decided to introduce emergency vaccination where at least one of the following conditions applies:
      (a) outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have been confirmed and threaten to become widespread in the Member State where such outbreaks have been confirmed;
      (b) other Member States are at risk due to the geographical situation of or the prevailing meteorological conditions in relation to reported outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in a Member State;
      (c) other Member States are at risk due to epidemiologically relevant contacts between holdings on their territories and holdings keeping animals of susceptible species in a Member State where there are outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease;
      (d) Member States are at risk due to the geographical situation or the prevailing meteorological conditions in a neighbouring third country where there are outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease."
      (LEU6 - full text provided)
  • Note: The OIE has accepted the use of "vaccinate to live" with appropriate serological testing for non-structural proteins allowing a return to FMD free status in six months, i.e. only three months longer after the last case than with stamping-out-only. (W31.Sept07.w2)
    "Recovery of free status

    1. When an FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in an FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised:
    a) 3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological surveillance are applied in
    accordance with Appendix 3.8.7.; or
    b) 3 months after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Appendix 3.8.7.; or
    c) 6 months after the last case or the last vaccination (according to the event that occurs the latest), where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination not followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated animals, and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Appendix 3.8.7., provided that a serological survey based on the detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population.

    Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply, and Article 2.2.10.2. or 2.2.10.4. applies."

    (W31.Sept07.w2 - Terrestrial Animal Health Code Sixteenth Edition: Chapter 2.2.10 Foot and mouth Disease - full text provided)

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Available vaccines

Modern inactivated vaccines are grown in cell culture, inactivated using binary ethylenimine, and emulsified with adjuvants such as aluminium hydroxide and saponin or mineral oil. Live vaccines are not currently in use. Novel vaccines have been developed and evaluated but no commercial products are available at this time.

Available vaccines for emergency use in FMD-free countries include stocks of antigen for emergency vaccine in national and international vaccine banks such as the International Vaccine Bank, European Union Vaccine Bank and the North American Vaccine Bank. 

Note:

  • The immune response to an initial vaccination depends on the dose of antigen used. High potency vaccines are preferred for use in emergency situations, e.g. with a potency of at least 6 PD50.
  • A good match between the field virus to be protected against and the vaccine strain is important.
    • This can be assisted by ongoing surveillance regarding which serotypes and strains of FMDV are in circulation.
  • Emergency vaccines may be effective in as short a time as three days, with immunised cattle, sheep and pigs being protected by four to seven days after vaccination, or even 3-4 days with use of appropriate adjuvants.
  • The stored antigens can be used to produce double-oil-emulsion vaccines suitable for use in both ruminants and pigs.
  • A "booster" vaccine would be required six months after the initial dose of emergency vaccine in an ongoing disease outbreak.

Commercial (lower potency) vaccines are also widely available although their use is subject to national legislation. The potency of commercial vaccines will depend on the specific requirements of the customer but these are usually administered in two doses three to four weeks apart to develop full immunity, with a "booster" vaccination approximately six months later.

(B47, B216, B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J16.22.w1, J70.12.w1, J70.16.w2, J70.17.w4, J112.25.w3, J249.91.w2, V.w23, W32.Apl01.sib1)

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Determining how effective vaccination is

"Current inactivated FMD vaccines are very efficient when properly administered, with a single inoculation producing a protective immune response which is sufficient to protect against severe challenge" (J70.10.w3).

How effective vaccination is depends on several factors:

Factors relating to the vaccine and its handling:

  • The potency of vaccine.
  • Storage and transport of the vaccine.
  • Proper use (correct handling and injection).

Factors relating to the vaccination regime and the animals:

  • The percentage of the susceptible population which is vaccinated: vaccination is most effective if all animals of all susceptible species are vaccinated.
  • Similarity between the field strain and the vaccine strain used.
  • The immune response of the individual animal.
  • The time between vaccination and challenge.
  • The level of challenge.
  • Mixing of stock.

(J16.8.w1, J16.22.w1, J21.41.w2, J21.46.w1, J35.148.w1, J35.151.w1, J70.6.w1, J70.6.w2, J70.10.w1, J70.10.w2, J70.10.w3, B210.89.w89, W32.Apl01.sib1)

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Issues associated with the use of vaccines in non-domestic species

Current vaccines which are designed for use in Bos taurus - Domestic cattle and Sus domesticus - Domestic pigs are likely to be suitable for use in other animals of the families Bovidae and Suidae; in addition it is likely that they would confer some immunity in other species groups (particularly the other related cloven-hoofed species i.e. Artiodactyls). The vaccines are usually tested on Cavia porcellus - Domestic guinea pig, which are Rodents - animals with very different physiological systems from the animals for which vaccine use is intended, suggesting that cross-species protection is likely. FMD vaccines have been used in a variety of non-domestic species within zoos in e.g. India, the Netherlands and Germany.

For non-domestic species, the route of vaccination is extremely important, as remote injection (darting) may be needed. In this situation a preparation suitable for intramuscular use is required.

Potential problems associated with the use of vaccines in species for which they have not been tested are of two types:

  1. There is the possibility of localised tissue reactions or even allergic reaction to the vaccine, although the risk of reactions can be minimised by using vaccines produced under standards of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), based on purified antigens and adjuvants.
  2. There is the possibility that the vaccine will not be protective if the mechanism of immunity in the target species is obscure.

N.B.

  • Inactivated vaccines currently in use, and produced by reputable manufacturers according to European Union standards of GMP, are fully innocuity tested and do not cause FMD infection. There is therefore no risk of causing disease in non-domestic species by using these vaccines.
  • At Amsterdam zoo, where many animals of a variety of species were vaccinated intramuscularly with a concentrated water-based vaccine, no abscesses or tissue necrosis were reported. (J64.21.w26)
  • Limited data from zoo species of Bovidae - Cattle, antelopes, etc. (Family) in Europe and antelope in Africa suggest that these species do develop a serological response following vaccination with killed adjuvanted FMDV vaccines. (J1.16.w16, J64.21.w26)

Notes regarding emergency vaccination measures for zoo animals:

  • In the Northumberland Report (Northumberland Report: The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease 1968 Part Two) it was suggested that if ring vaccination became necessary, certain categories of animals close to the vaccination area, such as zoo animals, herds of wild cattle and valuable pedigree animals might be applied as a "once only" operation (D37.Para214).
  • The European Commission and the Standing Veterinary Committee agreed (4th April 2001), relating to the ongoing FMD outbreak, that in the event of an outbreak of FMD occurring within 25 kilometres of a zoo, emergency vaccination of susceptible species of zoo animals should be allowed for zoos containing endangered (Red list) species.
  • It was further agreed that in exceptional circumstances this vaccination could be extended to cover extremely rare breeds or animals used for irreplaceable and important research work. It was recognised that such vaccination might jeopardise the FMD status of the country involved even though limited to special categories of animals not primarily concerned by trade, but it was stated that the Commission would defend such vaccination to the relevant international institutions e.g. OIE (W19.2001/303/EC).
  • The Infectious Diseases in Livestock [Royal Society Inquiry Report] stated that there was a "clear cut" case for use of vaccination to protect zoological collections and rare breeds, considering that they "are genetically important, are held in secure locations and do not participate in in normal trading movements" but noted the need for certain detailed conditions to be met: 
    • "the groups of animals concerned should be designated in advance of an outbreak;
    • bio-sanitary precautions must be agreed in advance, subject to inspection, and approved as part of the designatory process (for zoos, such arrangements could be defined in the Secretary of State’s Standards of Modern Zoo Practice); and
    • the locations would be accepted under EU law as ‘FMD-free zones where vaccination is practised’."

    (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)

  • COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease (European Union) allows for special considerations for zoo (and some other) animals:

    MEASURES TO BE APPLIED IN SPECIAL CASES

    Article 15

    Measures to be applied in case of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the vicinity or within certain specific premises keeping on a temporary or regular basis animals of susceptible species

    1. Where an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease threatens to infect animals of susceptible species in a laboratory, zoo, wildlife park, and fenced area or in bodies, institutes or centres approved in accordance with Article 13(2) of Directive 92/65/EEC and where animals are kept for scientific purposes or purposes related to conservation of species or farm animal genetic resources, the Member State concerned shall ensure that all appropriate bio-security measures are taken to protect such animals from infection. Those measures may include restricting access to public institutions or making such access subject to special conditions.

    2. Where an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease is confirmed in one of the premises referred to in paragraph 1, the Member State concerned may decide to derogate from Article 10(1)(a), provided that basic Community interests, and in particular the animal health status of other Member States, are not endangered and that all necessary measures are in place to prevent any risk of spreading foot-and-mouth disease virus.

    3. The decision referred to in paragraph 2 shall immediately be notified to the Commission. In the case of farm animal genetic resources, this notification shall include a reference to the list of premises established in accordance with Article 77(2)(f), by which the competent authority has identified these premises in advance as breeding nucleus of animals of susceptible species indispensable for the survival of a breed.

    In the UK, Defra has noted that "These special measures may include derogation from killing all susceptible animals if the premises become infected and consideration of the use of emergency vaccination if the premises falls within a vaccination zone." (W66.Sept07.w7)

(B214.3.14.w6, B214.3.17.w7, J1.16.w16, J64.11.w1, J64.21.w26, J71.57.w1, J78.3.w1, P5.6.w1, P5.40S.w1, D37.Para214, W32.Apl01.sib1).

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Risks of vaccination

Risks of vaccination teams transmitting disease from animals with subclinical (unrecognised) infection or which are incubating the disease, to other animals on non-infected farms, particularly in an emergency vaccination situation.
  • This risk is real but can be minimised by:
    • Proper understanding and application of biosecurity measures by vaccination teams when moving between premises. (J70.17.w5, J249.91.w2, W19.Sept07.w1 - COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - full text provided) or by vaccination being carried out on each farm by the farmer and their trained staff (eliminating the possibility of cross-contamination from movements of people) (J249.91.w2).
    • Careful design of vaccination programmes, for example by starting ring vaccination at the outer edge of the area to be vaccinated (i.e. furthest from known infected premises) and working inwards (as well as rapidly vaccinating animals in farms close to known infected premises). (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)
  • The risk should be lower than for teams involved in culling, particularly since fewer people are required (B495.9.w9 - full text provided).

Time before vaccinated animals become protected

  • Protection is not instantaneous following vaccination, therefore disease control may require more animals to be vaccinated than the number that would be culled to produce the same protective effect. (B495.6.w6 -full text provided)
  • "Potency of the vaccines is critical." (B495.8.w8 - full text provided)

Difficulties in differentiating between animals which have been vaccinated and those which have been infected.

  • Traditional serological (blood) tests, for example the virus neutralization test and the solid-phase competitive ELISA, which are the prescribed tests for international trade (W31.Sept07.w4), cannot distinguish vaccinated animals from animals which have been infected with Foot-and-Mouth Disease Virus). 
  • However, serological tests for antibodies to non-structural proteins (NSPs) have now been developed which are able to distinguish between animals which have been vaccinated against FMD (but not exposed to virus prior to or following vaccination) and those which have actually been infected with foot-and-mouth disease virus (whether or not they have been vaccinated). These tests have been most widely validated for cattle, but also appear to be appropriate for pigs and sheep. They are certainly able to distinguish between herds which have been exposed infection and those which have not (B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J64.21.w25, W31.Sept07.w4). See: 
  • The OIE has accepted the principle that tests for NSPs can be used to demonstrate absence of infection in vaccinated populations following emergency vaccination for control of an outbreak of FMD in a normally FMD-free country (W31.Sept07.w2).
  • Note: It is important to use purified antigens, not containing NSPs, in vaccines for emergency use, to ensure that serological tests for NSPs can distinguish between vaccinated and infected animals. (B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J249.91.w2)

Possibility of vaccinated animals becoming carriers (following undetected mild/subclinical infection, or without ever developing a general infection) and then infecting unvaccinated animals.

  • Ruminants, including vaccinated animals, which come into contact with live FMD virus, may carry the virus in the back of their throat (oropharynx area), for a time which varies with species, e.g. up to three years in cattle, nine months in sheep and shorter times in goats and deer. These animals are described as "carriers."
  • The epidemiological importance of FMDV carrier animals in the spread of FMD is disputed. Carrier animals are considered by some scientists to represent a small but important risk of initiating further outbreaks of FMD. Other scientists believe the risk to be exaggerated and very low. It is probable that, with the possible exception of Syncerus caffer - African buffalo, transmission of virus from carriers to susceptible animals is a very rare event, not a significant risk of maintaining or spreading FMD (B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J64.21.w2, J64.21.w28, J249.91.w2), and the risk of transmission from a vaccinated carrier "is probably considerably lower and close to zero" (J249.91.w2).
    • "Mere demonstration of viral persistence is, in itself, insufficient to fulfil the requirements of a carrier in the epidemiological sense and it does not mean that such animals are contagious to others." (B495.8.w8 - full text provided)
    • Circumstantial field evidence suggests that carrier cattle may occasionally transmit virus to susceptible animals in close contact with them. Most of the evidence for this comes from early in the Twentieth Century, before virological techniques allowed confirmation of strain identity.
    • Experimentally, it has not been possible to prove transmission of virus from carrier domestic livestock to other animals under controlled (biosecure) experimental conditions, although a few field experiments have claimed to show transmission from carrier Syncerus caffer - African buffalo to Bos taurus - Domestic cattle
    • Many experiments attempting to transmit infection from carrier livestock to susceptible animals, some involving large numbers of animals, have failed to show any transmission. 
    • Vaccination of animals with properly inactivated vaccines will not in itself produce carriers (B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J64.21.w28).
    • Vaccinated animals are unlikely to become carriers following exposure to relatively small quantities of FMD Virus from fomites etc. (J64.21.w28).
    • There is no evidence that vaccinated animals, even if they become carriers, cause infection in susceptible animals: "follow-up outbreaks, caused by the presence of vaccinated carrier animals, have never been observed." (P5.40S.w2).
    • Vaccinated animals may occasionally become carriers without developing antibodies to the virus. However, used on a herd basis it should be possible to distinguish between vaccinated herds in which the virus has circulated (and in which there might be carriers) and those which have never encountered the virus (in which there cannot be any carriers), by using blood tests for non-structural proteins (NSP). (J69.20S2.w1).

Need for definite identification of vaccinated animals and control of their movements.

  • Vaccinated animals would need to be marked for identification purposes in order to allow different management of vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals (B495.8.w8 - full text provided). Control of the movement of vaccinated animals for three weeks following vaccination has been suggested to reduce the small risk that vaccinated animals might come into contact with the virus soon after vaccination, become subclinically infected, and then transmit the virus to non-vaccinated animals.
  • As an example, The Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Control of Vaccination) (England) Regulations 2006 sets out the requirements for ear tags, marking of cattle passports and alternatives to ear tags (e.g. if a tag must be removed "to prevent unnecessary pain and suffering" and, for the same reason, cannot be replaced). (LUK32 - The Foot-and-Mouth Disease (Control of Vaccination) (England) Regulations 2006 - full text provided)

Perceived public health risks from meat, milk etc. from vaccinated animals.

  • There are no risks to human health from FMD vaccines (which are inactivated vaccines) entering the food chain. Meat from animals vaccinated against FMD is commonly eaten in many countries, including in countries which are free from FMD.
  • It should be possible for meat and milk from vaccinated animals, that have not been infected with FMDV, to be used for human consumption (B495.8.w8 - full text provided).

Risk of transmission of disease in meat, milk etc. from subclinically infected animals.

  • Special restrictions may be placed on moving animal products, and processing animal products, from vaccinated animals, until the disease has been eliminated from the area, to avoid any risk of virus from subclinically infected animals causing outbreaks outside the vaccinated area. 

Source of virus for FMD outbreaks

  • There is a risk that outbreaks of FMD may occur related to the use of improperly inactivated vaccine or "escape" of virus from production plants or laboratories. These have been sources of virus for outbreaks in the past in Europe (and most recently in the UK in 2007 (W66.Sept07.w8)). Modern levels of biosecurity and Good Manufacturing Practice regulations () greatly reduce these risks. (B495.8.w8 -full text provided).

For FMD-free countries, increased time and costs to regaining FMD-free status for trading purposes

  • The OIE prescribes the following for recovery of FMD-free status: (W31.Sept07.w2)

"Recovery of free status

1. When an FMD outbreak or FMDV infection occurs in an FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised, one of the following waiting periods is required to regain the status of FMD free country or zone where vaccination is not practised:
a) 3 months after the last case where a stamping-out policy and serological surveillance are applied in
accordance with Appendix 3.8.7.; or
b) 3 months after the slaughter of all vaccinated animals where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Appendix 3.8.7.; or
c) 6 months after the last case or the last vaccination (according to the event that occurs the latest), where a stamping-out policy, emergency vaccination not followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated animals, and serological surveillance are applied in accordance with Appendix 3.8.7., provided that a serological survey based on the detection of antibodies to nonstructural proteins of FMDV demonstrates the absence of infection in the remaining vaccinated population.

Where a stamping-out policy is not practised, the above waiting periods do not apply, and Article 2.2.10.2. or 2.2.10.4. applies."

((W31.Sept07.w2 - Terrestrial Animal Health Code Sixteenth Edition: Chapter 2.2.10 Foot and mouth Disease - full text provided))

(B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J21.46.w1, J42.118.w1, J64.91.w2, J69.20S2.w1, J70.9.w1, J70.10.w3, J70.12.w1, J70.17.w2, J71.142.w1, J71.143.w1, J71.145.w1, J80.61.w1, J249.91.w2, LUK32, P5.40S.w2, V.w23, W31.Sept07.w2, W32.Apl01.sib1, W66.Sept07.w8)

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Benefits of vaccination

Vaccinated animals are protected against FMD and will not normally develop the disease. This may give several benefits:

Disease control

  • Vaccination can help stop FMD from spreading. (J249.91.w2)
  • Decisions regarding slaughter or otherwise can be delayed. (J112.25.w3)
  • There is likely to be less risk of vaccination teams spreading the virus through lapses in biosecurity than of culling and disposal teams (which are larger) spreading the virus. (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)

Benefits to the animal

  • Vaccinated animals will not suffer from the severe clinical disease which can occur with FMD. Except where used as part of a "vaccinate and cull" policy around infected areas, livestock which have been vaccinated do not need to be culled.
    • Changes in OIE regulations have reduced the difference in time penalty between "vaccinate-to-kill" and "vaccinate-to-live" programmes; there is now only a three month difference in time from the last case/last vaccination to regaining "FMD free" status, between culling vaccinated animals and employing serological surveillance for non-structural proteins to demonstrate that FMDV is absent from the vaccinated population. (W31.Sept07.w2 - Terrestrial Animal Health Code Sixteenth Edition: Chapter 2.2.10 Foot and mouth Disease - full text provided))

Benefits to the farmer/other livestock

  • Vaccinated animals, even if subsequently infected, do not excrete large quantities of virus therefore the total amount of virus in the environment will be greatly reduced. Low level excretion may occur with subclinical infection if infected prior to fully developing protection, but much less than with full disease (B495.9.w9 - full text provided, J21.23.w1, J70.23.w4). There is no evidence that vaccinated animals, even if they become carriers, cause infection in susceptible animals: "follow-up outbreaks, caused by the presence of vaccinated carrier animals, have never been observed." (J70.12.w1). Vaccinating livestock would therefore reduce the risk of infection of other livestock, reduce the number of farms on which the disease occurs and reduce the number of animals needing to be culled.
  • The loss of genetically valuable stock and rare breeds, including e.g. hill sheep which are particularly adapted to their local area (hefted sheep), is avoided. (D35.w2)
  • The loss of income to farmers associated with loss of stock due to either infection on the premises or extended culling of non-infected stock for disease control purposes is avoided, along with the costs to the government of compensation.
  • Movement restrictions may be lifted within a relatively short time following the end of the period in which exposure to infection may occur (e.g. two or three weeks, depending on the policy in force).

Benefits to the environment/wildlife

  • Vaccination of domestic livestock could prevent virus entering susceptible wildlife populations in areas where domestic and wild species share habitat (e.g. deer in uplands in the UK). Vaccination of wild animals such as deer would be very difficult or impossible, however vaccinating domestic livestock would reduce the risk of the disease being passed to wildlife (D35.w2). This would reduce the risk of extinction of small populations of susceptible animals, and the associated more general risk to the environment from the potential loss of animals important to their habitat and to other species within that habitat.
  • The environmental risks associated with disposal of carcasses following culling operations may be greatly reduced (reduction in carcasses and potential pollution of the environment, particularly water courses, with fluids from carcasses).
  • Reduction in use of disinfectant (e.g. less farms becoming infected and requiring cleaning and disinfection) reduces the risk to the environment from contamination of watercourses with disinfectants and detergents.

Cost and logistical benefits

  • Vaccination costs considerable less per farm than does culling and cleansing. When it is necessary to undertake disease control over a wide area to quickly control an epidemic, there is a relatively small cost of vaccinating additional farms to control spread of FMD, compared to the cost of culling and cleansing of additional farms. (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)
  • The logistical resources (personnel etc.) required for vaccination, while considerable, are significantly less than those required for culling, carcass disposal and cleaning and disinfection of premises. (B495.9.w9 - full text provided)

Other benefits

  • Meat, milk and other animal products from vaccinated animals may enter the human food chain as usual. There are no risks to human health from meat, milk or other products from animals vaccinated with FMD vaccines (which are inactivated vaccines) entering the food chain (J249.91.w2, W32.Apl01.sib1).
  • There could be a greatly reduced cost of compensation, as fewer animals would become infected and need to be culled.
  • In an enzootic area, vaccination may assist in the eventual eradication of FMD from the region.
    • N.B. good quality, reliable vaccines are essential.
  • Life in the vaccinated area can return to normal or near normal within a few weeks, minimising socio-economic consequences of the outbreak. (B495.9.w9 - full text provided, J249.91.w2)

(B495.9.w9 - full text provided, D35.w2, J3.102.w6, J19.73.w1, J21.23.w1, J64.21.w25, J70.12.w1, J70.23.w4, J249.91.w2, W31.Sept07.w2 - Terrestrial Animal Health Code Sixteenth Edition: Chapter 2.2.10 Foot and mouth Disease - full text provided, W32.Apl01.sib1)

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Emergency vaccination programmes

In the face of an outbreak of FMD in a country which did not use routine/prophylactic vaccination, and where, therefore, the livestock population would be highly susceptible to the disease, emergency vaccination programmes may be used ALONGSIDE OTHER MEASURES (slaughter, movement restrictions, disinfection) to control the outbreak. Emergency vaccination can also be used to prevent disease entering a country in the face of an outbreak in a neighbouring country, and in a country which routinely vaccinates, in order to boost immunity in the face of an outbreak, or to provide immunity against a serotype or strain of the virus not covered by the routine vaccines. For emergency use, high-potency vaccines are essential (B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J112.25.w3, J249.91.w2).

Emergency vaccination is the vaccination of animals in the face of an outbreak. There are a number of different protocols which could be used. The criteria affecting the choice of whether to vaccinate and which protocol to apply are discussed in the page Control Options for Stopping FMD Virus Spreading (Foot and Mouth Disease Control).

The contingency plan which was developed in the UK following the 1967-68 FMD epidemic and the findings of the Northumberland Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease 1986 Parts One and Two, D36 and D37) allowed for the stamping-out policy "to be supplemented by ring vaccination if, on veterinary assessment, it is considered necessary to use vaccine, either to help restore a dangerous situation or to limit the spread of disease." (J35.134.w2).

The option to use emergency vaccination was retained by the European Union when routine vaccination was abandoned after 1991, and stores of highly concentrated antigens were set up to allow the rapid deployment of emergency vaccination if required.

The main documents used in this discussion of the use of an emergency vaccination programme are based on the situation in Western Europe in general (Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (European Union) (D35.w1 - full text provided)) and COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease (W19.Sept07.w1 - full text provided); and the UK in particular (The Northumberland Report: The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Disease 1968 Part One (D36).

[Editor's note: Definitions of terms used on this page and similar terms which may cause confusion are outlined below: Definitions].

Ring vaccination:

  • In 1968, the Northumberland Report defined "ring vaccination" "Ring vaccination is the vaccination of all susceptible animals in a prescribed area around an outbreak" (D36.Para213). It went on to give details of how this could be carried out, working from the centre of an outbreak outwards and the outer perimeter of a defined area inwards.
    • "Control of foot-and-mouth disease by ring vaccination may be carried out in a country with a completely susceptible livestock population. It involves the vaccination of all susceptible animals in a prescribed area around an outbreak and depends for its success on the rapidity by which diagnosis, typing the virus and vaccination are carried out.... Vaccination may be carried out in conjunction with the slaughter of the infected animals and those that have been in contact with them". (D36.Para213).
    • Details of how a ring vaccination programme could be carried out, including consideration of the appropriate use of such a programme, its limitations and legal and ethical considerations are described in: Ring Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

The 1999 Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare suggested that "ring vaccination" should be refined in concept and split into two separate types of emergency vaccination, "protective" emergency vaccination and "dampening down" emergency vaccination, either or both of which may be applied in the event of an outbreak. In both cases, high-potency vaccines would be used and clinical examination would precede vaccination, with vaccination going ahead only on properties free of clinical FMD. As with ring vaccination, these programmes would be carried out as a part of an overall strategy including stamping-out, movement restrictions, disinfection of infected premises and general zoo-sanitary measures.

"Dampening down" or "Suppressive" vaccination:

  • 'Dampening down' emergency vaccination is vaccination carried out within the protection zone, in a known foot and mouth disease infected area where it is considered that there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of virus circulating and the risk of spread beyond the area. It could also be described as "ring vaccination and cull", with the outer edge of the ring being relatively close to the centre of the outbreak, e.g. to or just past the outer limit of the "protective zone".
    • Directive 2003/85/EC defines "suppressive vaccination" as: "emergency vaccination which is carried out exclusively in conjunction with a stamping-out policy in a holding or area where there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of foot-and-mouth disease virus circulating and to reduce the risk of it spreading beyond the perimeters of the holding or the area and where the animals are intended to be destroyed following vaccination. (W19.Sept07.w1) i.e., this is "vaccinate to cull" (B494.13.w13 - full text provided)
    • Details of how a "Dampening down" emergency vaccination programme could be carried out, including consideration of the appropriate use of such a programme, its limitations and legal and ethical considerations are described in: Damping-down Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

"Protective" Emergency vaccination

  • 'Protective' emergency vaccination is vaccination carried out on holdings outside the "protected zone", i.e. outside the known infected area, in order to create an immune zone and protect the animals within the area being vaccinated against airborne infection from the infected area;
    • Directive 2003/85/EC defines "protective vaccination" as: " emergency vaccination carried out on holdings in a designated area in order to protect animals of susceptible species within this area against airborne spread or spread through fomites of foot-and-mouth disease virus and where the animals are intended to be kept alive following vaccination" (W19.Sept07.w1) i.e., this is "vaccinate to live" (B494.13.w13 - full text provided)

    • Details of how a "Protective" emergency vaccination programme could be carried out, including consideration of the appropriate use of such a programme, its limitations and legal and ethical considerations are described in: Protective Emergency Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease states the following criteria for implementation of emergency vaccination (W19.Sept07.w1 - full text included):

Article 50 Decision on introducing emergency vaccination
1. It may be decided to introduce emergency vaccination where at least one of the following conditions applies:
(a) outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease have been confirmed and threaten to become widespread in the Member State where such outbreaks have been confirmed;
(b) other Member States are at risk due to the geographical situation of or the prevailing meteorological conditions in relation to reported outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in a Member State;
(c) other Member States are at risk due to epidemiologically relevant contacts between holdings on their territories and holdings keeping animals of susceptible species in a Member State where there are outbreaks of foot-and mouth disease;
(d) Member States are at risk due to the geographical situation or the prevailing meteorological conditions in a neighbouring third country where there are outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease.

Criteria for the decision to apply protective vaccination and guidelines for the emergency vaccination programme are set out in COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - Annex X - full text provided. Indications were previously described in Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare - D35.w1 - full text provided:

  • High population density of susceptible animals
  • Significant number of pigs involved
  • Evidence of movement of potentially infected animals or products out of the protection zone
  • High predicted airborne spread of virus from infected premises
  • Suitable vaccine available
  • Widespread distribution of outbreaks
  • Suitable vaccine available
  • Unknown origin of outbreaks
  • Incidence slope of outbreaks rising rapidly
  • Widespread distribution of outbreaks
  • Strong public reaction to total stamping out policy
  • Acceptance of regionalisation after vaccination.

(Strategy for Emergency Vaccination against Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Report of the Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare - D35.w1 - full text provided, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - Annex X - full text provided)

Conversely, a predominance of the opposite circumstances would indicate that the use of emergency vaccination may not be a necessary/appropriate adjunct to other measures such as slaughter, movement restrictions, quarantine and disinfection to control an outbreak of FMD. (COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - Annex X - full text provided, D35.w1 - full text available)

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - Annex X also gives the following additional criteria for the decision to introduce emergency vaccination:

  • Known acceptance of regionalisation by third countries;
  • "If it is forseeable that a control strategy without emergency vaccination would lead to significantly higher economic losses in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors"
  • It is foreseeable that the 24/48 hours rule (stamping out of infected herds within 24 hours and pre-emptive killing of animals likely to be contaminated or infected within 48 hours) cannot be implemented effectively for two consecutive days
  • Significant social and psychological impact of total stamping out policy
  • Existence of large holdings of intensive live stock production in a non-densely populated livestock area

(COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - Annex X - full text provided)

Both the EU Strategy for Emergency Vaccination (D35.w1) and the Northumberland Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Diseases 1968) suggestions regarding emergency vaccination are very clear that rapid implementation of such policies alongside other measures such as stamping out is important in order to confine the area affected by the disease and the proportion of the population requiring vaccination. These documents make it clear that if emergency vaccination programmes are not implemented rapidly, and FMD becomes widespread, regional or national vaccination (mass vaccination) may be the only remaining option for the control of the disease.

  • "If an analysis of parameters gives a result which supports a programme of protective emergency vaccination then the programme must be implemented without delay. It is emphasised that if decision-making and the required actions are delayed and as a consequence the initiative is lost and the disease becomes widespread, then the only remaining option may be a programme of either regional or national vaccination." (D35.w1)
  • "If, as would happen in the event of a large number of scattered outbreaks, large areas of the country and large numbers, say fifty per cent of animals were involved in ring vaccination, then general prophylactic vaccination would probably become inevitable." (D36.Para207).

Note from the Northumberland Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Diseases 1968) regarding ring vaccination:

  • The Northumberland Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Diseases 1968) recommended continuing the slaughter policy for control of foot-and-mouth outbreaks, with contingency plans for the application of ring vaccination if the number of outbreaks were not limited by controls on meat imports (D36.Para 222). A dissenting note recommended the immediate application of ring vaccination in any outbreak, due to the fact that any small introduction of virus could produce another large epidemic and that for potentially epidemic outbreaks, ring vaccination could substantially decrease (by about half) the total number of farms affected (D36.Dissenting Note).

Emergency Mass Vaccination

Mass vaccination may be necessary on an emergency, one-off basis (including single booster if required) in the event of an outbreak of FMD affecting large areas of a country:

Details of how a Emergency mass vaccination programme could be carried out, including consideration of the appropriate use of such a programme, its limitations and legal and ethical considerations are described in: Emergency Mass Vaccination for Foot-and-Mouth Disease

  • In order to control the disease without slaughtering excessive numbers of livestock
  • To reduce the risk of the disease spreading into areas with large populations of wildlife in which the disease might then circulate.
    • If FMD became endemic in a wildlife population, control of the disease in that population might require the eradication of that wild population. this may be difficult/impossible, and may not be publicly acceptable.
    • If FMD became endemic in a wildlife population, control of the disease in domestic livestock would require ongoing (routine/prophylactic) vaccination of livestock and/or the setting up of barriers to prevent contact between domestic livestock and wild animals.

Failure of control of an outbreak of FMD by the use of emergency mass vaccination alongside other measures would lead to the disease becoming established (endemic) and require a prolonged programme of routine/prophylactic vaccination.

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"Barrier" vaccination programme

The Northumberland Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Foot-and-Mouth Diseases 1968) defined "Barrier vaccination": "Barrier vaccination involves vaccination of the susceptible animals in a buffer zone to prevent foot-and-mouth disease spreading from one area to another. The successful application of this type of vaccination programme depends on the knowledge of the distribution and movement of the types and sub-types of the virus." D36.Para120.
  • This type of vaccination programme can be used to prevent FMD entering from an adjacent country. It as been employed by the EU on a number of occasions to reduce the risks of FMD entering the EU, by assisting with the vaccination of animals in countries such as Turkey and Bulgaria (J3.102.w10, J112.25.w3).
  • When used to prevent the spread of FMD from one country to another, barrier vaccination may also be described as frontier vaccination (B211).
  • Depending on the circumstances, monovalent or polyvalent vaccines may be used. (D36.Para120).
  • Barrier vaccination has been used successfully in the past to reduce spread of FMD into Europe, by vaccinating livestock.
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"Prophylactic / Routine" vaccination programme

Definition: general, prophylactic or routine vaccination is the vaccination of susceptible livestock on a routine basis (e.g. yearly, or more frequently), whether or not a disease outbreak occurs, to provide a level of protection against FMDV infection.
  • Prophylactic or general vaccination is usually used in areas where FMD is endemic, or areas with a high risk of infection. It was used as part of the policy to eradicate FMD from mainland Europe and has enabled some countries to control FMD effectively despite the disease persisting in neighbouring countries. The use of prophylactic vaccination does not imply that a country will remain as an FMD endemic country.
  • Routine vaccination is used to reduce production losses from FMD in endemic areas.
  • Prophylactic vaccination may be used together with a slaughter policy (infected animals or infected plus in-contact animals) and stringent sanitary measures to deal with disease outbreaks; sometimes ring vaccination may be used around outbreaks in addition to routine vaccination.
  • The use of FMD vaccines may be governed by statutory regulations specifying both the route and frequency of vaccination.
  • Prophylactic vaccination is not permitted in the EU.

(B207, B494.13.w13 - full text provided, B495.8.w8 - full text provided, J3.102.w10, J16.22.w1, D36.Para119, W19.Sept07.w1 - COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2003-85-EC of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease - full text provided).

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Future vaccine developments

Research continues into the development of vaccines which would overcome one or more of the limitations on the FMDV vaccines presently available: 
  • requirement for different vaccines for protection against different virus types and subtypes;
  • potential revision to virulence (for live attenuated vaccines);
  • escape of virus from vaccine production units;
  • improper activation of virus;
  • requirements for cold storage;
  • relatively short endurance of immunity.

(B210.89.w89, B495.8.w8 - full text provided)

Additionally, an ideal vaccine would be cheap to produce, simple to administer, provide good levels of maternal immunity, and allow easy distinction between vaccinated and infected animals. (B495.8.w8 - full text provided)

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Definitions, Synonyms, and Confusion of Terms

The use of different terms for the same policies and similar terms for different policies in a variety of published texts or information on Website may cause confusion. The lack of consistency is not surprising, given that different documents may have been written years or decades apart. Frequently, terms have been taken for granted and not defined, probably because they were, at the time of writing, in common use and generally understood, at least within the professional (veterinary/scientific) communities for which the texts were originally intended. Definitions of terms used in Wildpro and notes on terms used in various publications over the past three decades (approximately) are included here in the hope of reducing confusion.

Definition: Ring Vaccination is the vaccination of all susceptible animals in a prescribed area around an outbreak (D36.Para213).

Definition: Protective Emergency Vaccination: is vaccination carried out on holdings outside the "protected zone", i.e. outside the known infected area, in order to create an immune zone and protect the animals within the area being vaccinated against airborne infection from the infected area;

  • The area of 'protective' emergency vaccination should be as small as possible (but sufficiently large that it is unlikely that unvaccinated animals outside this area will be infected by airborne virus), and its shape should be related to the geographical and meteorological situation. The inner boundary of the vaccination area should be clearly defined; on the basis of the available epidemiological data, it may include a part of the surveillance zone (i.e. an area 'at risk'), but not the protection zone.
  • "'protective' emergency vaccination is vaccination carried out on holdings in order to create an immune zone and protect the animals within the area being vaccinated against airborne infection from the infected area; " [1999] (D35.w1 - full text available)

  • 2007: ‘protective vaccination’: "emergency vaccination carried out on holdings in a designated area in order to protect animals of susceptible species within this area against airborne spread or spread through fomites of foot-and-mouth disease virus and where the animals are intended to be kept alive following vaccination" (LEU6 - W19.Sept07.w1)

Definition: "Dampening down" emergency vaccination: is vaccination carried out within the protection zone, in a known foot and mouth disease infected area where it is considered that there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of virus circulating and the risk of spread beyond the area. It could also be described as "ring vaccination and cull", with the outer edge of the ring being relatively close to the centre of the outbreak, e.g. to or just past the outer limit of the "protective zone"

  • "To reduce the quantity of virus spread within the suspected infected area (='dampening down' emergency vaccination)

    'dampening down' emergency vaccination
    is vaccination which should be used only in conjunction with a pre-emptive slaughter policy in a known foot and mouth disease infected area where it is considered that there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of virus circulating and the risk of spread beyond the area. This may be indicated as a measure to assist pre-emptive slaughter particularly in the following circumstances: a high density of animals (especially pigs); an overwhelming of the capacity to kill and dispose of carcasses within a short time period, poor infrastructure, inadequate manpower or delayed stamping out. In the event that this emergency vaccination is applied, stamping out procedures should continue and be applied to the animals, irrespective of the implementation of vaccination." (D35.w1 - full text available)

  • [2007]‘suppressive vaccination’: "emergency vaccination which is carried out exclusively in conjunction with a stamping-out policy in a holding or area where there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of foot-and-mouth disease virus circulating and to reduce the risk of it spreading beyond the perimeters of the holding or the area and where the animals are intended to be destroyed following vaccination." (LEU6 - W19.Sept07.w1)

Definition: General, prophylactic or routine vaccination is the vaccination of susceptible livestock on a routine basis (e.g. yearly, or more frequently), whether or not a disease outbreak occurs, to provide a level of protection against FMDV infection.

Definition: Surveillance Zone:

European Union Council Directive 85/511/EEC of 18 November 1985 introducing Community measures for the control of foot- and-mouth disease Article 9: "1.) Member States shall ensure that, once the diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease has been officially confirmed, the competent authority establishes, around the infected holding, a protection zone based on a minimum radius of 3km and a surveillance zone based on a minimum radius of 10km. The establishment of zones must take account of natural boundaries and supervision facilities."

LEU3 - European Union Council Directive 90/423/EEC of 26 June 1990 amending Directive 85/511/EEC introducing Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine and Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine animals and swine and fresh meat or meat products from third countries. of 26 June 1990 within Article 1 amends Directive 85/511/EEC Article 9, replacing "The establishment of zones must take account of natural boundaries and supervision facilities." with "The definition of zones shall take account of natural boundaries, supervision facilities and technological progress which make it possible to foresee the possible dispersion of the virus by air or any means and will have to be reviewed, if necessary, in the light of such elements."

Definition: Protection Zone:

European Union Council Directive 85/511/EEC of 18 November 1985 introducing Community measures for the control of foot- and-mouth disease Article 9: "1.) Member States shall ensure that, once the diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease has been officially confirmed, the competent authority establishes, around the infected holding, a protection zone based on a minimum radius of 3km and a surveillance zone based on a minimum radius of 10km. The establishment of zones must take account of natural boundaries and supervision facilities."

LEU3 - European Union Council Directive 90/423/EEC of 26 June 1990 amending Directive 85/511/EEC introducing Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease, Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine and Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine animals and swine and fresh meat or meat products from third countries. within Article 1 amends Directive 85/511/EEC Article 9, replacing "The establishment of zones must take account of natural boundaries and supervision facilities." with "The definition of zones shall take account of natural boundaries, supervision facilities and technological progress which make it possible to foresee the possible dispersion of the virus by air or any means and will have to be reviewed, if necessary, in the light of such elements."

Possible confusions and alternative terminology:

Watson (J3.102.w7), in summarising information about current (1978) control procedures for Great Britain, referred to the potential use of "ring vaccination". A variety of other papers (Davies, 1993- J64.12.w1, Leforban, 1999 - J70.17.w1) also talk about ring vaccination. It would appear that the term "ring vaccination" as defined in the Northumberland report is generally taken as understood by these papers. Donaldson & Doel (1992) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of strategic ("ring") vaccination; this also appears to be the same as the "ring vaccination" described in the Northumberland report (J3.131.w1).

Descriptions of vaccination strategies described on the MAFF Website:

  • "firebreak policy" (W32.Apl01.sib1): appears to refer to 'protective' emergency vaccination (D35.w1) and also 'barrier vaccination'
  • "suppressive vaccination" (W32.Apl01.sib1): appears to refer to 'damping-down' emergency vaccination (D35.w1)
  • MAFF also describes the use of what it calls "protective vaccination" (W32.Apl01.sib1)- vaccination of particular groups or species in an area to protect them;
  • It describes "mass vaccination" as when "protective vaccination" is used on a very large scale over a whole region or country". (W32.Apl01.sib1)

Reweyemamu et al. 1982 (J16.22.w1) mentions vaccination on a selective basis in endemic areas, "for example of high-grade exotic animal stock".

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Authors & Referees

Authors Dr Debra Bourne MA VetMB PhD MRCVS
Referee Suzanne I Boardman BVMS MRCVS

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